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Abstract 
Overgrazing is widely acknowledged to be the main driver of grassland degradation. Governments seeking to 
address the grassland degradation problem have therefore focused on policies designed to reduce overgrazing. 
The Chinese government has implemented a series of policies with the aim of protecting the grasslands from 
more serious degradation. The efficacy of these policies has been questioned given that, since their 
introduction, stocking rates have remained high in many affected areas. It has been suggested that the 
government should enhance grassland monitoring and the punishment of overgrazing. Increasing penalties 
would reduce stocking rates, however that is likely to cause more social and economic problems. A survey of 
1588 herders found that 40% consider the government should set a grass-animal balance rule and implement 
it strictly, and 30% think the government should only recommend a grass-animal balance rule for herders to 
follow，only 30% of herders were likely to set the stocking rate by themselves. An analysis of the survey data 
showed that household expenditure (food, house, clothing, medical expenses) was an important driver of 
overgrazing. Most herders depend upon their livestock for income; only 3% have a part-time job, compared to 
over 30% of all Chinese farmers. On average 70% of a herders’ income comes from livestock production and 
around 26% comes from subsidies. The contingent model developed found that, increasing subsidies with 
punishment for non-compliance, should reduce stocking rates and help maintain herders’ income, but not to 
the level required to alleviate poverty and unsustainable. We suggest that herders need training to improve 
their business skills so they can move from a focus on survival to one where optimising production and better 
marketing, are the aims of their livestock enterprise. Demonstration farms need to be part of this training. 
Introduction 
Grasslands cover about 40 percent of China’s land territory, and play important role in livestock production 
and ecological security. However, over 80% of China’s grassland degraded during last 100 years. Overgrazing 
is widely accepted to be the main driver of grassland degradation (Valle Junior et al., 2019; Herrero and 
Thornton, 2013; Liu et al., 2013). Thus, the Chinese government has implemented a series of policies with the 
aim of protecting the grasslands from more serious degradation. These policies have included the establishment 
of private ‘use rights’ over land, ‘return grazing to grassland project (tui mu huan cao)’, the ‘grain to green 
program (tui geng huan lin huan cao)’, the Beijing-Tianjin sand storm control program and the ‘grassland eco-
subsidy and award policy’ (Robinson et al., 2017). The efficacy of these policies has been questioned given 
that, since their introduction, stocking rates have remained high in many affected areas (Li et al., 2017; Wang 
et al., 2016). Many researches have concluded that these policies failed to reduce stocking rates due to 
insufficient subsidy, monitor, enforcement and compliance (Wang et al., 2016; Chen et al., 2014; Yin, 2017). 
However little research has explored the reason why herders overgraze the grasslands and herders’ preferences 
are overlooked as well both in policy making and researches.  
Methods and Study Site 
Herders’ preferences and policy effects on reducing stocking rates were analysed using choice modelling 
(Louviere and Woodworth, 1983) and contingent behaviour model(Martínez-Espiñeira et al., 2015), based on 
the face to face household survey that was carried out in Inner Mongolia, one of the traditional grassland 
provinces in China. After 5 focus groups and a pilot survey involving 30 interviews, 5 policy attributes were 
selected as the choice experiment attributes:  pension payments, loan period, the enforcement of policies, 
punishment for overgrazing, and subsidy payment (table 1). Herder respondents were also asked to state 
the number of sheep equivalents and the amount of land they rented in under their selected policy mix  
Attributes  Status quo Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 
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 Table 1 Policy attributes and levels 
 alternative. Using these contingent behaviour responses, and the answers to a question on the area of land 
currently accessed for grazing, herder stocking rates were calculated to form a dependent variable to be 
explained in a GLS regression model by the policies and a range of socio-economic variables. 
Stocking rates under all policy scenarios were then estimated from the GLS model, and a list of potential policy 
mixes were? ordered in terms of the stocking rates they are predicted to induce. Taking the current stocking 
rate and what local ecologists think as acceptable stocking rates into account, threshold stocking rates were 
determined at 0.94, 0.61 and 1.39 sheep unit/ ha in typical steppe, desert steppe and sandy steppe, respectively. 
Using these thresholds, the policy mixes that are capable of achieving sustainable stocking rates were analysed 
for their popularity among herders.  
The utility of each policy mix was estimated from the choice model. This allows the policy mixes that achieve 
the threshold stocking rates to be ranked in terms of their utility. Given that the utility of the existing policy 
mix can also be estimated using the choice model, it is then possible to consider how alternative policy mixes 
compare, in terms of utility, against the status quo. Those policy mixes yielding herder utility levels greater 
than the status quo can be concluded to be more popular amongst herders than the current policy mix.   
Herders’ attitudes in grassland rules are investigated online by Wechat App through China’s grassland region, 
covering all 13 provinces where the grassland eco-compensation policy has been implemented.  
 
Results 
Herders’ policy preferences 
A conditional logit model of choice was used to estimate pastoralists’ preferences to  policy choices (table 2). 
The result showed that the higher the pension payment and the longer the loan repayment period the more 
likely that herder respondents would choose an alternative policy mix. The greater the chance of being caught 
and the higher the penalty imposed for breaches, the less likely an alternative policy mix was chosen. The 
payment of an increased but conditional subsidy also increased a herder’s likelihood of choosing a new policy 
option. The contracted grassland area, rented grassland area, the hay production area, as well as herder age and 
education level showed significant influences on the respondent herders’ choices.   
Table 2  Estimated results of choice model 
Variables  Conditional logit model with social-economic characters 
Coefficient Standard error  
Pension  0.001*** 0.000 
Loan  0.181*** 0.022 
Penalty  -0.001*** 0.000 
Enforcement -0.014*** 0.002 
Payment  0.225*** 0.016 
asc -2.162*** 0.352 
Contracted land  0.008*** 0.000 
Rented land  -0.001*** 0.000 
Grassland for hay production 0.003*** 0.001 
Age of respondents 0.028*** 0.007 
Desert Steppe 0.759*** 0.182 
Sandy Steppe 1.218*** 0.189 
Log likelihood -1470.4826 
Number of observations 5085 
Pension (yuan/month) 300 600 900 1200 
Loan period (year) 1 2 3 5 
Enforcement (%) 10 30 50 70 
Punishment (yuan/sheep)  100 200 400 600 
Subsidy   No conditions on 
payment, 2.5 
yuan/mu 
5 yuan per mu if 
complies with the grass 
animal balance rule 
otherwise no payment.  
7.5 yuan per mu if 
complies with the grass 
animal balance rule 
otherwise no payment. 
10 yuan per mu if 
complies with the grass 
animal balance rule 
otherwise no payment. 
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LR chi2(8) 783.33 
Prob> chi2 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.2103 
AIC(Akaike Information Criterion) 2964.965 
BIC(Bayesian Information Criterion) 3043.374 
                        
Stocking rates under different policy scenarios 
From table 3 we can see, the policy variables used as independent variables all have negative coefficients (ie. 
increases in the policy attributes cause expected stocking rates to fall).  However, only pension, punishment 
and enforcement have statistically significant effects on stocking rate: increased pension payments and/or 
punishment for exceeding stocking rates and/or probability of being caught will cause stocking rates to fall. In 
contrast, the existing policies (loans and subsidies) have no significant impact on the herders’ desired stocking 
rates. 
Table 3: Stocking rate  as a function of policy variables 
Variable  Coefficient Standard error 
Policies   
Pension (1000CNY/month) -0.106*** 0.034 
Loan (years) -0.008 0.008 
Enforcement (% probability) -0.002*** 0.001 
Punishment (1000CNY / excess sheep) -0.164*** 0.058 
Payment (1000CNY / mu) -5.531 4.370 
Constant 1.184*** 0.100 
Socio-economic   
Contracted area (100 ha) -0.031*** 0.004 
Rented area (100 ha) 0.012*** 0.005 
Land used for hay (100ha) -0.039*** 0.012 
Age -0.006*** 0.001 
Household size 0.028*** 0.008 
Ethnic 0.138*** 0.027 
Education year 0.011*** 0.004 
Desert  -0.073**  0.032 
Sandy  0.693*** 0.031 
Number of obs 3590 
Prob>chi2 0.0000 
AIC  7251.864 
BIC 7344.653 
 
Ranking policies by stocking rates and popularity 
   Different mixes of policy measures have different effects on stocking rates in the three different regions of 
Inner Mongolia. Furthermore, the three different regions have different ‘threshold’ stocking rates. It was found 
that 995 of the possible policy mixes could achieve the threshold stocking rate in the typical steppe region 
while 48 could achieve the goal in the sandy steppe region and only 29 policy combinations reached the 
targeted 30% reduction in stocking rates for the desert steppe region. The 29 policy mixes that are predicted 
to achieve the threshold, sustainable stocking rates throughout the three grassland ecosystem types in Inner 
Mongolia are selected for popularity analysis.  
  The herder utilities of these 29 policy mixes ranged from 3.16 to 5.49 compared to the average herder utility 
produced by the status quo policy mix of 5.4. Of the 29 policy mixes only two provided herders with as average 
utility greater than that currently being enjoyed. Which indicated that only two possible policy mixes would, 
on average, make herders better off and achieve the required ecological condition of the grasslands. 
The two policy mixes that achieve the dual goals of improved herder well-being and improved grassland 
condition (to the desired threshold level across all ecological regions) involve a combination of penalties and 
rewards. Specifically, in terms of rewards the pension payment would rise (under both policy mixes) from 300 
yuan to 1200-yuan, loan repayments would be repaid after five years not one and the subsidy would rise from 
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2.5 yuan to 10 yuan. Penalties would also increase. The chance of being caught exceeding the legal stocking 
rates would have to rise (from 10 per cent) to a minimum of 50 per cent and the associated penalty would rise 
to 600 yuan (from 100 yuan). Alternatively, more effort could be allocated to enforcement to ensure a 70 per 
cent rate of detection and the penalty would need to rise to 400 yuan. 
Herders’ attitudes on grass-animal balance rules 
The grass-animal balance rule is written in China’s grassland law, which says that herders should adjust their 
animal group according to grassland condition.  Usually local governments set sustainable stocking rates based 
on grassland production and herders then can calculate how many animals they can raise based on their 
grassland areas and the stocking rate. With the low compliance of grass-animal balance rule, we have expected 
herders might dislike this rule and reject this rule. However, the survey data shew that 40% of the respondents 
consider the government should set the grass-animal balance rule and implement it strictly, and 30% think the 
government should only recommend a grass-animal balance rule for herders to follow，only 30% of herders 
were likely to set the stocking rate by themselves. This indicates that 70% of herders think this grass-animal 
balance rule is necessary, so that they wouldn’t intended to violate the rule.  
Discussion [Conclusions/Implications] 
As expected, both the punishment and penalty attributes included as policy options in this study have been 
shown to have significant influences on herders’ choices and their stocking rate intentions. Respondent herders 
were shown to dislike policies with higher probabilities of being caught in breach of stocking rate rules and 
higher penalties for such breaches. In the CB for policy alternatives with these characteristics, the sampled 
herders indicated that they would lower their stocking rates.  
While overgrazing is widespread in grassland, this study found that most herders do not intend to violate the 
However, grass-animal balance rule indicated that the incentives behind overgrazing are worth deep thinking 
considering the validity of grassland protecting policies. The survey shows that herders have less external 
income sources compared with farmers. Only 3% of the respondents have other job incomes compared to the 
general situation where about 30% of Chinese farmers have other part time job incomes. The high dependence 
of household income on livestock production makes it very difficult, or even impossible for some cases, to 
reduce stocking rate without a subsidy.  The key finding is that best policy combination to improve grassland 
condition while protecting pastoralists welfare, is to increase the subsidy level and enhancing penalties. As the 
sustainable development of herders’ livelihoods is important, more effort is needed to increase herders’ income 
resources as well as  productivity.  
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